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I.  THE FOUNDERS’ HISTORY: PRIOR EXPERIENCES WITH CONVENTIONS1 
Article V of the Constitution provides in relevant part: 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it 
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the 
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall 
call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, 
shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, 
when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, 
or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other 
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress. . . .2 
This language requires all amendments to be ratified by three-
fourths of the states (through legislatures or conventions).  It also 
provides for two distinct ways of proposal: by two-thirds of each 
chamber of Congress or by a “Convention for proposing Amendments,” 
called by Congress on application by two-thirds of the state legislatures. 
James Madison was a principal drafter of Article V.3  That he and 
the other Framers should turn to conventions, particularly interstate 
 
 1. Bibliographical Note: The following sources are referenced more than once in this Essay: 
  RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKSMANSHIP: AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION 
BY NATIONAL CONVENTION (Oxford Univ. Press 1988) [hereinafter CAPLAN]. 
  THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) 
[hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS]. 
  THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987), available 
at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch14s48.html [hereinafter FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION]. 
  ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON & JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST (George W. 
Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) [hereinafter THE FEDERALIST]. 
  John M. Harmon, Constitutional Convention: Limitation of Power to Propose 
Amendments to the Constitution, 3 Op. O. L. C. 390, 398-401 (1979) [hereinafter Harmon]. 
  STATE OF CONNECTICUT, THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT—FROM 
OCTOBER, 1776, TO FEBRUARY, 1778, INCLUSIVE (Charles J. Hoadly ed., 1894) [hereinafter 1 
HOADLY]. 
  STATE OF CONNECTICUT, THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT—FROM 
MAY, 1778, TO APRIL, 1780, INCLUSIVE (Charles J. Hoadly ed., 1895) [hereinafter 2 HOADLY]. 
  STATE OF CONNECTICUT, THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT—FROM 
MAY, 1780, TO OCTOBER, 1781, INCLUSIVE (Charles J. Hoadly ed., 1922) [hereinafter 3 HOADLY]. 
  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, SELECTIONS FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF THE EXECUTIVE OF 
NEW JERSEY FROM 1776 TO 1786 (1848) [hereinafter SELECTIONS]. 
  JAMES MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON (Galliard Hunt ed., 1900) (9 vols.) 
[hereinafter, MADISON, WRITINGS]. 
  Robert G. Natelson, Proposing Constitutional Amendments by Convention: Rules 
Governing the Process, 78 TENN. L. REV. 693 (2011) [hereinafter Natelson, Conventions]. 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added). 
 3. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 559 (Sept. 10, 1787) (reproducing Madison’s 
offer to the convention of nearly final language). 
2
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conventions, as tools for amendment was not at all surprising: 
Conventions were well-precedented ways of accomplishing specific 
political tasks of the kind best not left to legislatures.  Moreover, as 
Madison grew in age and experience, he came to view the “Convention 
for proposing Amendments” as an instrument by which states could 
resist an abusive or overreaching federal government.  This Essay traces 
that development in Madison’s thought. 
The founding generation employed the word convention in the 
political context to denote an assembly that, unlike a legislature, was 
assembled for a particular project, to be dissolved once its work was 
complete.4  It was, in other words, a sort of ad hoc committee.  In the 
seventeenth century, the English-speaking peoples had made much use 
of this device: “Convention Parliaments” reorganized the government in 
England in 1660 and 1689,5 and in the latter year, the American 
colonists held at least four conventions of their own.6  During the 
eighteenth century, American colonists continued to resort to 
conventions,7 particularly during the Founding Era.8 
Founding-Era conventions differed widely in the scope of their 
powers.  Some, referred to as “plenipotentiary” conventions, enjoyed 
very wide authority.”9  A plenipotentiary constitutional convention 
might both draft a new state constitution and adopt it.10  The authority of 
other conventions was more restricted, and some were limited to a single 
discrete task.  For example, the 1777 Georgia Constitution authorized 
conventions whose only purpose was to draft and promulgate any 
constitutional amendment whose subject matter was specified in 
petitions from a majority of counties.11  Similarly, the U.S. Constitution 
 
 4. Natelson, Conventions, supra note 1, at 706. 
 5. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 5-6. 
 6. Id. at 6 (discussing two conventions in Massachusetts, one in New York, and one in 
Maryland). 
 7. Id. at 7-9.  See also RICHARD D. BROWN, REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS IN MASSACHUSETTS: 
THE BOSTON COMMITTEE OF CORRESPONDENCE AND THE TOWNS, 1772-1774, at 29-31 (describing 
the 1768 Massachusetts Convention of Towns, which met in lieu of the colonial assembly, which 
the royal governor had dissolved); ROBERT C NEWBOLD, THE ALBANY CONGRESS AND PLAN OF 
UNION OF 1754, at 28 (1955) (mentioning numerous inter-colonial conventions on Indian affairs). 
 8. In this essay, the term “Founding Era” refers to the period from 1774, when the First 
Continental Congress met, through 1791, when the Bill of Rights was ratified. 
 9. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 23.  On this usage, see also id. at xx-xxi (explaining usage) & 20 
(quoting Hamilton). 
 10. An example was the Delaware Constitution of 1776. See The Avalon Project at the Yale 
Law School, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/de02.htm (editors’ note). 
 11. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LXIII (“No alteration shall be made in this constitution without 
petitions from a majority of the counties, and the petitions from each county to be signed by a 
majority of voters in each county within this State; at which time the assembly shall order a 
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authorized state conventions limited either to ratifying or rejecting the 
Constitution12 or ratifying or rejecting proposed amendments.13  The 
distinction between plenipotentiary and limited-purpose conventions 
often is forgotten today, particularly by people who confuse conventions 
held under the Constitution with plenipotentiary constitutional 
conventions.14  But the distinction is crucial to understanding the role of, 
and rules governing, gatherings held under Article V. 
Although many Founding-Era conventions served only a single 
colony or state, some were inter-colonial or interstate gatherings.15  
From 1774 until 1787, there were at least a dozen inter-colonial or 
interstate conventions.16  Most of these meetings were called by one or 
more colonial or state legislatures or by governing state conventions; a 
few were called by Congress or by prior interstate conventions.17  The 
 
convention to be called for that purpose, specifying the alterations to be made, according to the 
petitions preferred to the assembly by the majority of the counties as aforesaid.”). 
 12. U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
 13. Id. art. V. 
 14. While there has long been some confusion along these lines, it did not become widespread 
until the twentieth century.  See generally Robert G. Natelson, Learning from Experience: How the 
States Used Article V Applications in America’s First Century (Nov. 04, 2010), 
http://www.goldwaterinstitute.org/article/5353.  Thus, the distinction was still understood when 
George Bancroft wrote his celebrated history of the United States.  6 GEORGE BANCROFT, A 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 197 (1882, 1884) (referring to the need in the 1780s for a 
plenipotentiary interstate convention, as opposed to a convention of more limited scope).  
  Particularly since the 1960s, activists seeking to discourage use of the state-application-
and-convention procedure have argued that a convention for proposing amendments would be a 
“constitutional convention” or “con-con,” and thus a body inherently plenipotentiary and 
uncontrollable.  CAPLAN, supra note 1, at vii-viii (quoting various public figures) & 146-47 
(quoting Theodore Sorensen).  Groups such as the John Birch Society have devoted considerable 
resources promoting this claim.  See, e.g., Constitution Threatened by New Constitutional 
Convention Initiative, http://www.jbs.org/freedom-campaign/4941 (last accessed Feb. 21, 2011). 
However, it is difficult to find historical or legal justification for this position. 
 15. The initial impulse was to call them “Congresses,” adapting a term then commonly used 
for an assembly of sovereignties.  This had been done for the Albany Congress of 1754, and the 
term was applied to the First and Second Continental Congresses.  Perhaps because “Congress” 
came to be used for the assembly that provided regular central government (however weak), see 
generally ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, after the First Continental Congress all ad hoc 
interstate gatherings were referred to as conventions. 
 16. Excluded from this count are the Second Continental Congress, which served as a (weak) 
central government for more than six years; the 1785 meeting at Mt. Vernon between Maryland and 
Virginia to discuss rights to the Potomac River and other bodies of water; and the Confederation 
Congress (1781-89), which was a regularly-established government, albeit with very limited 
powers. 
 17. See, e.g., Simeon E. Baldwin, The New Haven Convention of 1778, in THREE HISTORICAL 
PAPERS READ BEFORE THE NEW HAVEN HISTORICAL SOCIETY 3, at 37-38 (1882) (listing and 
discussing those interstate conventions commissioned to deal with issues of public credit).  For 
example, Massachusetts called the Springfield Convention, 1 HOADLY, supra note 1, at 599, 
Congress called the York Town Convention. 7 J. CONT. CONG. 124-24 (Feb. 15, 1777), and the 
4
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principal inter-colonial assembly was the First Continental Congress 
(also referred to as a convention);18 the interstate conventions included 
the 1787 Philadelphia gathering, and at least ten others:  two in 
Providence, Rhode Island (1776-77 and 1781); one in Springfield, 
Massachusetts (1777); one in York Town, Pennsylvania (1777);19 one in 
New Haven, Connecticut (1778); two in Hartford, Connecticut (1779 
and 1780); one in Philadelphia (1780); one in Boston (1780); and one in 
Annapolis (1786).20  Attendance at these gatherings ranged from three 
states to twelve. 
Interstate conventions, like their intrastate counterparts, varied in 
the scope of their authority.  The scope of the First Continental Congress 
(1774) was nearly plenipotentiary: “to consult and advise [i.e., 
deliberate]21 with the Commissioners or Committees of the several 
English Colonies in America, on proper measures for advancing the best 
good of the Colonies.”22  The Springfield Convention of 1777 probably 
enjoyed the second broadest scope.  It was entrusted with issues of 
currency, monopoly and economic oppression, and interstate trade 
restrictions—although its authority was limited explicitly to matters 
outside the competence of Congress.23  The three-state Boston 
Convention of 1780 was charged with all aspects of the ongoing 
 
Hartford Convention of 1779 called the Philadelphia Convention of 1780.  2 HOADLY, supra note 1, 
at 568 (reproducing the call); id. at 574 (reproducing the Rhode Island and Connecticut credentials 
to the Philadelphia convention, referring to the call at Hartford); id. at 575 (reproducing the New 
Jersey credentials to the Philadelphia convention, referring to the call at Hartford). 
 18. 1 J. CONT. CONG. 17-18 (Sept. 5, 1774) (quoting the credentials of the Connecticut 
delegates, empowering them to attend the “congress, or convention of commissioners, or 
committees of the several Colonies in British America”). 
 19. On the York Town Convention, see infra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 20. For a summary of special purpose conventions, see CAPLAN , supra note 1, at 17-21, 96.  
Caplan does not mention the Boston Convention, which is referenced at 17 J. CONT. CONG. 790 
(Aug. 29, 1780) and 18 J. CONT. CONG. 790, at 932 (Oct. 16, 1780).  The journals of the 
Providence, Springfield, New Haven, Hartford, Boston, and Philadelphia (1780) conventions are 
reproduced in 1 HOADLY, supra note 1, at 585-620; 2 HOADLY, supra note 1, at 562-79; and 3 
HOADLY, supra note 1, at 559-76.  The journal (“minutes”) of the York Town convention are in 
SELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 34-45. 
  The roster and recommendations of the Annapolis Convention are at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/annapoli.asp. 
 21. On the meaning of “to advise” in this context as “to deliberate,” see ROBERT G. 
NATELSON, THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION: WHAT IT REALLY SAID AND MEANT 72-74 (2d ed. 
2011). 
 22. 1 J. CONT. CONG. 17-18 (Sept. 5, 1774) (reproducing commission of Connecticut 
delegates). However, state credentials differed on whether delegates had the power to determine 
questions, e.g. id. at 15 (reproducing New Hampshire credentials empowering delegates “to devise, 
consult, and adopt), or merely to propose solutions to the states, e.g., id. at 23 (reproducing Virginia 
credential empowering delegates only “to assemble . . . to consider”). 
 23. 1 HOADLY, supra note 1, at 599. 
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Revolutionary War.  The convention interpreted this charge liberally to 
include recommendations on trade and currency.24 
The first Providence Convention (1776-77) was restricted to price-
stabilization and defense measures.25  Shortly thereafter, Congress 
recommended that states attend interstate conventions in York Town, 
Pennsylvania, and Charleston, South Carolina to consider the single 
subject of price-stabilization.26  Because the meeting at Providence had 
recommended measures on that subject for New England,27 Congress 
recommended that New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, 
Delaware, and Virginia meet at York Town, and that the Carolinas and 
Georgia convene at Charleston.  I have not been able to verify that the 
Charleston convention ever took place;28 the York Town convention did 
meet, but adjourned without issuing a recommendation because of a tie 
vote among the states present.29 
Interstate meetings at New Haven (1778) and Philadelphia (1780) 
also focused exclusively on price regulation.30  The first Hartford 
Convention (1779) was empowered to address currency and trade,31 and 
the second (1780) met “for the purpose of advising and consulting upon 
measures for furnishing the necessary supplies of men and provision for 
the army.”32  The second Providence Convention (1781) was entrusted 
only with recommending how to provide supplies to the army for a 
single year.33  The 1780 Philadelphia gathering was empowered to 
 
 24. 3 HOADLY, supra note 1, at 559-64. 
 25. 1 HOADLY, supra note 1, at 585-86. 
 26. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 17; 7 J. CONT. CONG. 124-25 (Feb. 15, 1777) (reproducing the 
congressional recommendations).  
 27. Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island attended.  Maine was 
then part of Massachusetts, and Vermont had not yet been admitted to the union. 
 28. Cf. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 17 (asserting that it did not).  Similarly, when Congress 
called the New Haven convention for the eight northernmost states, it also recommended that 
Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina convene in Fredericksburg and that South Carolina and 
Georgia meet in Charleston, 9 J. CONT. CONG. 956-57 (Nov. 22, 1777), but I have found no 
evidence that the latter two gatherings ever occurred. 
 29. SELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 43-45.  See also Byron W. Holt, Continental Currency, in 5 
SOUND CURRENCY, at 81, 106-07 (Apr. 1, 1898) (discussing the York Town convention and other 
“price conventions”).  The claim in 3 RICHARD HILDRETH, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 182 (1880) that the York Town convention arrived at a price-fixing agreement is 
inaccurate. 
 30. 1 HOADLY, supra note 1, at 607 (New Haven); 2 HOADLY, supra note 1, at 572 
(Philadelphia). 
 31. 2 HOADLY, supra note 1, at 562. 
 32. 3 HOADLY, supra note 1, at 565 (commission of New Hampshire delegate). 
 33. Id. at 575-76. 
6
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commit the participating states to the solutions it devised.34  Most 
interstate conventions, however, were authorized only to issue proposals 
for state ratification.35  
The last of the limited-subject interstate gatherings is today the 
most famous.  The Annapolis Convention of 1786 was to focus on “the 
trade and Commerce of the United States.”36  Its limited scope induced 
Madison, who served as a delegate, explicitly to distinguish it from a 
plenipotentiary convention.37 
For the most part, all of these conventions—today we might call 
them “task forces”—remained within the scope of their calls.38  If there 
was an exception, it was the abortive assembly at Annapolis, and that 
exception was solely to express the “wish” and “opinion” that another 
convention be held to consider defects in the political system.39 
As a result of all this experience, federal convention customs, 
practices, and protocols were fairly well standardized when Article V 
was written.40  As explained below,41 those customs, practices, and 
protocols formed the basis for how the Constitution’s convention for 
proposing amendments was expected to operate. 
II.  MADISON AND THE ADAPTATION OF THE CONVENTION TO THE 
AMENDMENT PROCESS 
The famous “Virginia Plan” was presented on May 29, 1787 to the 
Constitutional Convention by Virginia Governor Edmund Randolph, but 
probably was penned largely by Madison.  The Virginia Plan stated that 
“provision ought to be made for the amendment of the Articles of Union 
 
 34.  This is reflected in the call to Philadelphia by the 1779 Hartford Convention, 2 HOADLY, 
supra note 1, at 568, and in all but one of the state commissions. Id. at 572-77 (reproducing 
commissions).  
 35.  E.g., 7 J. CONT. CONG. 124 (Feb. 15, 1777) (reproducing congressional call for York 
Town convention “to consider of, and form a system of regulation adapted to those States, to be laid 
before the respective legislatures of each State, for their approbation”). 
 36. Proceedings of Commissioners to Remedy Defects of the Federal Government (Annapolis, 
Sept. 11, 1786), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/annapoli.asp.  Because only 
five states were present, the delegates voted not to proceed with their charge and suggested to 
Congress that it call a convention with a broader charge.  Cf. Harmon, supra note 1, at 398 (pointing 
out that the Annapolis Convention was limited in nature). 
 37. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 23.  On this usage, see also id. at xx-xxi (explaining usage) & 20 
(quoting Hamilton). 
 38. The recommendation of a day of prayer by the first Providence Convention, 1 HOADLY, 
supra note 1, at 598-99, would have been seen by the founding generation as within the call. 
 39. See supra note 36.  
 40. Natelson, Conventions, supra note 1, at 718. 
 41. Infra notes 52-61. 
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whensoever it shall seem necessary, and that the assent of the National 
Legislature ought not to be required thereto.”42  Cutting the national 
legislature out of the process would require an alternative procedure, 
which the Virginia Plan did not specify. 
On August 6, the committee of detail—five delegates charged with 
preparing the first draft of the Constitution—reported a plan that utilized 
an amendments convention.  It provided that “[o]n the application of the 
Legislatures of two thirds of the States in the Union, for an amendment 
of this Constitution, the Legislature of the United States shall call a 
Convention for that purpose.”43  This proposal looked much like that in 
the Georgia Constitution mentioned earlier.44  Two-thirds of the states 
(instead of voters in majority of counties, as in Georgia) would decide 
what kind of amendments they wanted, whereupon Congress would be 
required to call a convention to draft and impose them.  The committee 
of detail’s plan did not provide for a further ratification procedure. 
Delegates raised three sorts of objections to the committee’s 
formulation.  Alexander Hamilton of New York suggested that Congress 
as well as the states ought to have power to propose amendments 
because its position would enable it readily to perceive defects in the 
system.45  Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts objected to amendment 
without final approval by the states.46  Madison wondered why, if states 
applied for one or more amendments, a convention was necessary: He 
“did not see why Congress would not be as much bound to propose 
 
 42. 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 22 (May 29, 1787).  See also id. at 202-03 (June 
11, 1787), paraphrasing George Mason in discussing a resolution “for amending the national 
Constitution hereafter without consent of Natl. Legislature”: 
Amendments therefore will be necessary, and it will be better to provide for them, in an 
easy, regular and Constitutional way than to trust to chance and violence.  It would be 
improper to require the consent of the Natl. Legislature, because they may abuse their 
power, and refuse their consent on that very account.  The opportunity for such an abuse, 
may be the fault of the Constitution calling for amendment. 
Mason was supported on this point by Edmund Randolph.  Id. 
 43. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 188 (Aug. 6, 1787). 
 44. Supra note 11. 
 45. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 558 (Sept. 10, 1787) (paraphrasing Alexander 
Hamilton as stating, “The National Legislature will be the first to perceive and will be most sensible 
to the necessity of amendments”). 
 46. Id. at 557-58: 
Mr Gerry moved to reconsider art XIX. viz, “On the application of the Legislatures of 
two thirds of the States in the Union, for an amendment of this Constitution, the 
Legislature of the U. S. shall call a Convention for that purpose.” 
  This Constitution he said is to be paramount to the State Constitutions.  It follows, 
hence, from this article that two thirds of the States may obtain a Convention, a majority 
of which can bind the Union to innovations that may subvert the State-Constitutions 
altogether.  He asked whether this was a situation proper to be run into– . . . . 
8
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amendments applied for by two thirds of the States as to call a 
Convention on the like application.”47  The delegates accommodated 
Hamilton’s objection by granting Congress co-equal power to propose.  
They met Gerry’s objection by adding a requirement that three-fourths 
of states approve amendments.48  Madison’s objection was not met, 
probably because the delegates did not believe that Congress should be 
entrusted with drafting state-promoted amendments designed to limit 
congressional power.  Madison then wondered whether the issue should 
be reconsidered because it was unclear to him how an amendments 
convention would be formed, and what its rules or the force of its acts 
would be.49  Shortly thereafter, nonetheless, he was sufficiently 
reconciled to the convention concept to prepare the draft that became the 
direct forerunner of Article V.50 
 
 47. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 629-30. See also Harmon, supra note 1, at 390, 
398-401 (discussing this remark in wider context). 
 48. 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 558-59: 
On the motion of Mr. Gerry to reconsider 
N. H. divd. Mas. ay-- Ct. ay. N. J-- no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N-- C. ay. S. C. 
ay. Geo. ay. [Ayes -- 9; noes -- 1; divided -- 1.] 
**** 
Mr. Sherman moved to add to the article “or the Legislature may propose amendments to 
the several States for their approbation, but no amendments shall be binding until 
consented to by the several States” 
Mr. Gerry 2ded. the motion 
Mr. Wilson moved to insert “two thirds of” before the words “several States” -- on 
which amendment to the motion of Mr. Sherman 
N. H. ay. Mas. <no> Ct. no. N. J. <no> Pa. ay-- Del-- ay Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. 
no. Geo. no. [Ayes -- 5; noes -- 6.] 
Mr. Wilson then moved to insert “three fourths of” before “the several Sts” which was 
agreed to nem: con: 
 49. Id. at 558 (Sept. 10, 1787) (“Mr Madison remarked on the vagueness of the terms, ‘call a 
Convention for the purpose.’ as sufficient reason for reconsidering the article.  How was a 
Convention to be formed?  by what rule decide?  what the force of its acts?”). 
 50. Id. at 559: 
Mr. Madison moved to postpone the consideration of the amended proposition in order 
to take up the following, 
‘The Legislature of the U-- S-- whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem 
necessary, or on the application of two thirds of the Legislatures of the several States, 
shall propose amendments to this Constitution, which shall be valid to all intents and 
purposes as part thereof, when the same shall have been ratified by three fourths at least 
of the Legislatures of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as 
one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Legislature of the U. S:’ 
Mr. Hamilton 2ded. the motion. 
* * * * 
On the question On the proposition of Mr. Madison & Mr. Hamilton as amended 
N. H. divd. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va ay. N. C. ay S. C. ay. 
Geo. ay. [Ayes -- 9; noes -- 1; divided -- 1.] 
9
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Madison may have been persuaded because it was readily 
understandable what sort of assembly the “Convention for proposing 
Amendments” would be, as well as the nature of its incidents and 
procedures.51  The obvious model was an institution resorted to 
repeatedly during the preceding thirteen years:  the interstate convention 
assigned to propose to the states a solution to one or more assigned 
problems.  Indeed, established legal doctrine would have incorporated 
their customs and protocols into the law of the Constitution.52  
What were those customs and protocols?  Interstate convention 
procedures were based on gatherings of international diplomats.53  Like 
international conventions, interstate conventions were called to 
deliberate on one or more problems and recommend one or more 
solutions.  The charge could be a broad one, but more often was rather 
specific.54 
An interstate convention consisted of delegations (“committees”) 
from each state, made up of delegates or “commissioners.”  The 
gathering as a whole sometimes was referred to a convention of “the 
states”55 or a convention of “committees.”56  The delegates were 
empowered, and the scope of their authority defined, by documents 
called “commissions” or “credentials.”  Like other agents, delegates 
were bound by the scope of their authority.57  They were subject to 
additional legislative instructions.58  The rule of suffrage was one vote 
per state.59   
 
 51. See Natelson, Conventions, supra note 1, at 706-08 (summarizing the historical record 
pertaining to Founding-Era conventions). 
 52. Id. at 703-06 (explaining the application of then-prevailing rules fiduciary responsibility 
and incidental power).  
 53. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 95-96 (citing Emer Vattel’s then-popular work on international 
law). 
 54. Supra notes 21-33 and accompanying text. 
 55. E.g., 2 HOADLY, supra note 1, at 578 (reproducing a resolution of the 1780 Philadelphia 
convention, referring to it as a “meeting of the several states”).  After the Constitution was ratified, 
early state applications applied similar nomenclature to a convention for proposing amendments.  
See source cited infra note 67. 
 56. E.g., 17 J. CONT. CONG. 790 (Aug. 29, 1780) (referring to the 1780 Boston Convention as 
a “convention of committees”). 
 57. CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 95-96.  See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, supra note 1, at 215 
(James Madison) (“The powers of the convention ought, in strictness, to be determined by an 
inspection of the commissions given to the members by their respective constituents”). 
 58. E.g., 2 HOADLY, supra note 1, at 574 (reproducing Rhode Island’s instructions to its 
delegates at the 1780 Philadelphia Convention, which dealt with price inflation). 
 59. Natelson, Conventions, supra note 1, at 741.  See also SELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 43-44 
(recording votes by states at the York Town Convention). 
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Interstate conventions enjoyed uncontested authority to set their 
own rules and elect their own officers.60  Within the scope of their 
authority, interstate conventions were deliberative bodies, not mere 
rubber stamps: They were, after all, commissioned to solve problems.61 
Madison recognized the role of the amendments convention as a 
diplomatic meeting of the states; this is evidenced by his observation in 
The Federalist that, because of the state-application-and-convention 
procedure, the Constitution “equally enables the general and the State 
governments to originate the amendment of errors.”62  For the state 
governments to enjoy such equality, they had to possess the same power 
to propose amendments that Congress had.  The convention was their 
vehicle for doing so. 
III.  MADISON AND THE AMENDMENTS CONVENTION AS A CHECK ON 
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
The two central issues during the ratification debates were whether 
the Constitution granted undue power to the federal government and 
whether the Constitution’s language was indefinite enough to enable 
federal officials to exceed or abuse the intended scope of their authority.  
Madison acknowledged the potential danger.  He saw the state 
governments as a principal remedy: 
[S]hould an unwarrantable measure of the federal government be 
unpopular in particular States, which would seldom fail to be the case, 
or even a warrantable measure be so, which may sometimes be the 
case, the means of opposition to it are powerful and at hand.  The 
disquietude of the people; their repugnance and, perhaps, refusal to co-
operate with the officers of the Union; the frowns of the executive 
magistracy of the State; the embarrassments [i.e., obstacles] created by 
legislative devices, which would often be added on such occasions, 
would oppose, in any State, difficulties not to be despised; would form, 
in a large State, very serious impediments; and where the sentiments of 
several adjoining States happened to be in unison, would present 
obstructions which the federal government would hardly be willing to 
encounter. 
  But ambitious encroachments of the federal government, on the 
authority of the State governments, would not excite the opposition of 
 
 60. Natelson, Conventions, supra note 1, at 740.  See also SELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 36 
(recording that Lewis Burwell of Virginia served as chairman at the York Town Convention, and 
the convention’s selection of a ways and means committee). 
 61. Natelson, Conventions, supra note 1, at 744. 
 62. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 1, at 238-39 (James Madison). 
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a single State, or of a few States only.  They would be signals of 
general alarm.  Every government would espouse the common cause.  
A correspondence would be opened.  Plans of resistance would be 
concerted.  One spirit would animate and conduct the whole.  The 
same combinations, in short, would result from an apprehension of the 
federal, as was produced by the dread of a foreign, yoke; and unless 
the projected innovations should be voluntarily renounced, the same 
appeal to a trial of force would be made in the one case as was made in 
the other.63 
Several options set forth in this passage presage state actions in 
later years—most recently, in state resistance to the 2010 federal health 
control law.64  But in this passage Madison, unlike some other 
Founders,65 did not refer explicitly to the state-application-and-
convention process as a potential tool to counter federal overreaching.  
The process was encompassed, perhaps, by the general expression, 
“Plans of resistance would be concerted.”  But there was no specific 
mention of it.  For this, there was good reason: at that point, Madison 
wished to discourage a second convention. 
In the summer of 1788, when it was apparent that Anti-Federalists 
could not prevent ratification of the Constitution, they turned their 
efforts to obtaining a new federal convention with nearly plenipotentiary 
authority to re-write the document.  Anti-Federalist sentiment was 
particularly strong in Virginia and in New York.  The New York 
ratifying convention issued a circular letter both recommending a new 
conclave and proposing over thirty amendments.66  Both New York and 
Virginia soon applied to Congress under Article V.  The New York 
application asked for a convention with an unlimited charge.  The 
Virginia application can be read as either limited or unlimited; but if 
 
 63. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, supra note 1, at 253 (James Madison). 
 64. The Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010). 
 65. E.g., Natelson, Conventions, supra note 1, at 699-700 n.21(mentioning George Mason and 
Edmund Randolph); 23 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
2522 (Merrill Jensen et al. eds., 1976), quoting Samuel Jones in the New York legislature as stating: 
The reason why there are two modes of obtaining amendments prescribed by the 
constitution I suppose to be this—it could not be known to the framers of the 
constitution, whether there was too much power given by it or too little; they therefore 
prescribed a mode by which Congress might procure more, if in the operation of the 
government it was found necessary; and they prescribed for the states a mode of 
restraining the powers of the government, if upon trial it should be found they had given 
too much. 
 66. Ratification of the Constitution by the State of New York; July 26, 1788, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ratny.asp (listing amendments and calling for a new 
convention). 
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limited, the convention requested still would have been able to consider 
all of the dozens of amendments proposed by the state ratifying 
conventions.67 
In late 1789 and early 1790, Madison wrote a series of letters to 
private correspondents counseling against such efforts.  Madison now 
acknowledged (as he had not done earlier) that a bill of rights was 
desirable.  But he insisted that proposal by Congress would be the “most 
expeditious mode.”68  Congress, he said, should be granted the 
opportunity to act, and would likely do so.69  Regardless, recent electoral 
results showed that a sufficient number of other states would not apply, 
leaving the campaign short of the necessary two-thirds.70  This was 
fortunate, because Federalists, he said, would never agree to a complete 
revision of the Constitution—a “mutil[ation of] the system”71—and 
some might oppose even useful amendments if proposed by a 
convention.72  A revision such as proposed by New York was 
unnecessary and certainly would be upsetting to American foreign 
 
 67. See CAPLAN, supra note 1, at 165-68 (reproducing Virginia and New York applications). 
 68. Letter from Madison to George Eve (Jan. 2, 1789), in THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987), available at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch14s48.html; Letter from Madison to Thomas Mann 
Randolph (Jan. 27, 1789), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS 338, 
340 (Gordon DenBoer ed., 1989). 
 69. Letter from Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Oct. 20, 1788), in 5 MADISON, WRITINGS, 
supra note 1, at 277 (“In the mean time the other mode of amendments may safely be employed to 
quiet the fears of many by supplying those further guards for private rights which can do no harm to 
the system in the judgment even of its most partial friends, and will even be approved by others who 
have steadily supported it.”); Letter from Madison to George Eve (Jan. 2, 1789), in FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1 (“Under this change of circumstances, it is my sincere opinion that the 
Constitution ought to be revised, and that the first Congress meeting under it, ought to prepare and 
recommend to the States for ratification, the most satisfactory provisions for all essential rights”). 
 70. E.g., Letter from Madison to Philip Mazzei (Dec. 10, 1788), in 5 MADISON, WRITINGS, 
supra note 1, at 316 (“All the States except North Carolina and Rhode Island have ratified the 
proposed Constitution. Seven of them have appointed their Senators, of whom those of Virginia, R. 
H. Lee and Col. Grayson, alone are among the opponents of the system.”); Letter from Madison to 
Jefferson (Dec. 8, 1788), in 5 MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 310 (“Here is already a 
majority of the ratifying States on the side of the Constitution.”). 
 71. Letter from Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 23, 1788), in 5 MADISON, WRITINGS, 
supra note 1, at 254 (“The object with them now will be to effect an early Convention composed of 
men who will essentially mutilate the system”); Letter from Madison to Jefferson (Dec. 8, 1788), in 
5 MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 195, 196 (“Those who have opposed the Constitution, are 
on the other hand, zealous for a second Convention, and for a revisal which may either not be 
restrained at all, or extend at least as far as alterations have been proposed by any State.”). 
 72. Letter from Madison to George Lee Turberville (Nov. 2, 1788), in 5 MADISON, WRITINGS, 
supra note 1, at 298-300; Letter from Madison to George Eve (Jan. 2, 1789), in FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1; Letter from Madison to Thomas Mann Randolph (Jan. 27, 1789), in 2 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS 338, 339 (Gordon DenBoer ed., 
1989). 
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policy and foreign creditors,73 but might be the unfortunate result of a 
convention dominated by Anti-Federalists74 elected “in the present 
temper of America.”75  Further, it was unclear to Madison that New 
York was restricting itself to an Article V convention; it might really 
want a plenipotentiary body.76 
A passage from a letter written by Madison around this time has 
been touted as evidence that he opposed Article V conventions in 
general.77  But his correspondence as a whole shows that his opposition 
was limited to the unrestricted sort of convention advocated by New 
York,78 and only during that period: Madison repeatedly asserted that he 
would not object to such a gathering in a year or two, after political 
 
 73. Letter from Madison to George Lee Turberville (Nov. 2, 1788), in 5 MADISON, WRITINGS, 
supra note 1, at 300-01. 
 74. Letter from Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Oct. 20, 1788), in 5 MADISON, WRITINGS, 
supra note 1, at 278 (“An early Convention . . . will comprehend men having insidious designs agst 
the Union”); Letter from Madison to Philip Mazzei (Dec. 10, 1788), in 5 MADISON, WRITINGS, 
supra note 1, at 316 (“The object of the Anti-Federalists is to bring about another general 
Convention, which would either agree on nothing, as would be agreeable to some, and throw 
everything into confusion, or expunge from the Constitution parts which are held by its friends to be 
essential to it.”). 
 75. Letter from Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 23, 1788), in 5 MADISON, WRITINGS, 
supra note 1, at 254 (“in the present temper of America”); Letter from Madison to Thomas Jefferson 
(Aug. 10, 1788), in 5 MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 244 (“The great danger in the present 
crisis is that if another Convention should be soon assembled it would terminate in discord, or in 
alterations of the federal system which would throw back essential powers into the State 
Legislatures.). See also Letter from Madison to George Lee Turberville (Nov. 2, 1788), in 5 
MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 298; Letter from Madison to George Eve (Jan. 2, 1789), in 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION,  supra note 1 (“in the present ferment of parties, and containing 
perhaps insidious characters from different parts of America”); Letter from Madison to Thomas 
Mann Randolph (Jan. 27, 1789), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS 
338, 340 (Gordon DenBoer ed., 1989) (“in the present foment of parties”). 
 76. Letter from Madison to George Lee Turberville (Nov. 2, 1788), in 5 MADISON, WRITINGS, 
supra note 1, at 299 (“A Convention cannot be called without the unanimous consent of the parties 
who are to be bound by it, if first principles are to be recurred to; or without the previous application 
of . . . the State legislatures, if the forms of the Constitution are to be pursued.”).  Cf. Letter from 
Madison to Philip Mazzei (Dec. 10, 1788), in 5 MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 1,  at 316 (“The 
[Federalists] are willing to gratify their opponents with every supplemental provision for general 
rights, but insist that this can be better done in the mode provided for amendments.”). 
 77. See, e.g., Larry Greenley, States Should Enforce, Not Revise, the Constitution!, THE NEW 
AMERICAN (Nov. 29, 2010),  http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/usnews/constitution/ 
5299-states-should-enforce-not-revise-the-constitution (John Birch Society webpage) (last accessed 
Feb. 21, 2011) (referring to a Letter from Madison to George Lee Turberville (Nov. 2, 1788), in 5 
MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 297). 
 78. Letter from Madison to George Lee Turberville (Nov. 2, 1788), in 5 MADISON, WRITINGS, 
supra note 1, at 298 (“You wish to know my sentiments on the project of another general 
Convention as suggested by New York.”). 
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passions had cooled, Congress had had a chance to adopt a bill of rights, 
and the government was in operation.79 
At this time, however, Madison remained silent on whether 
amendments conventions could be used to resist federal overreaching.  
In 1798, he drafted the Virginia Resolution,80 which objected to the 
federal Alien and Sedition Acts as unconstitutional.  The resolution did 
not call for nullification of federal laws, as is sometimes is claimed, but 
neither did it specifically suggest a convention.  Rather, it urged that 
“necessary and proper measures [] be taken by [other states] for co-
operating with this State, in maintaining unimpaired the authorities, 
rights, and liberties reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”81 
Although the Virginia Resolution and its Kentucky counterpart 
(which did call for nullification)82 are widely remembered today, it is 
less known that none of the other thirteen states then in the Union 
responded favorably to them: No state issued a resolution in support, and 
at least seven issued resolutions of condemnation.83 
However, while rejecting the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions, 
the Massachusetts legislature suggested as an alternative the use of 
Article V: 
[T]he people in that solemn compact, which is declared to be the 
supreme law of the land, have not constituted the state legislatures the 
judges of the acts or measures of the Federal Government, but have 
confided to them the power of proposing such amendments of the 
Constitution, as shall appear to them necessary to the interests, or 
conformable to the wishes of the people whom they represent.84 
 
 79. E.g., Letter from Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 23, 1788), in 5 MADISON, 
WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 254 (suggesting a delay of a year); Letter from Madison to Thomas 
Jefferson (Aug. 10, 1788), in 5 MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 244 (“The delay of a few 
years will assuage the jealousies which have been artificially created by designing men and will at 
the same time point out the faults which really call for amendment.”); Letter from Madison to 
Edmund Pendleton (Oct. 20, 1788), in 5 MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 278 (opposing a 
“premature Convention”). 
 80. 6 MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 178-79, available at http://www.constitution.org/ 
cons/virg1798.htm (last accessed Mar. 13, 2011). 
 81. Id. at 179. 
 82. The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, available at http://www.constitution.org/cons/ 
kent1798.htm (last accessed Mar. 13, 2011) (“where powers are assumed which have not been 
delegated, a nullification of the act is the rightful remedy”). 
 83. The counter-resolutions are available at http://www.constitution.org/rf/vr_04.htm (last 
accessed Mar. 13, 2011). 
 84. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Madison seems to have been intrigued.  When drafting resolutions 
for the Virginia legislature the following year, he relied on Article V to 
demonstrate that it was proper for the states to communicate with each 
other on constitutional issues: “The Legislatures of the States have a 
right also to originate amendments to the Constitution, by a concurrence 
of two-thirds of the whole number, in applications to Congress for the 
purpose.”85  Against the claim that Virginia was acting extra-
constitutionally, he added: 
It is no less certain, that other means might have been employed which 
are strictly within the limits of the Constitution.  The Legislatures of 
the States might have made a direct representation to Congress with a 
view to obtain a rescinding of the two offensive acts; or they might 
have represented to their respective Senators in Congress their wish 
that two-thirds thereof would propose an explanatory amendment to 
the Constitution; or two-thirds of themselves, if such had been their 
option, might, by an application to Congress, have obtained a 
Convention for the same object.86 
Thus, the Article V convention had become an appropriate weapon in 
Madison’s arsenal for resisting federal power.  The Article V convention 
was a tool of potential state “interposition”87 against congressional 
abuse. 
Madison pressed this point further during the nullification crisis of 
the late 1820s and early 1830s.  South Carolina officials claimed power 
to “nullify” within state borders any federal legislation they believed 
violated the constitutional “compact.”  To his chagrin, Madison 
witnessed the nullifiers relying, in part, on his 1798 Virginia Resolution. 
Accordingly, Madison penned a public letter to Edward Everett, a 
member of Congress and newspaper editor.  In the letter, Madison 
argued that the nullifiers were misinterpreting the Virginia Resolution.88  
The Constitution’s checks and balances, not nullification, comprised the 
proper tools for state resistance to federal overreaching: 
On the other hand, as a security of the rights & powers of the States in 
their individual capacities, agst. an undue preponderance of the powers 
granted to the Government over them in their united capacity, the 
 
 85. 6 MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 403. 
 86. Id. at 404. 
 87. Virginia Resolution, in 6 MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 326 (“the states . . . have 
the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for 
maintaining within their respective limits, the authorities, rights and liberties appertaining to 
them.”). 
 88. 9 MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 383-403 (Aug. 28, 1830). 
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Constitution has relied on, 1. The responsibility of the Senators and 
Representatives in the Legislature of the U. S. to the Legislatures & 
people of the States. 2. The responsibility of the President to the people 
of the U. States; & 3. The liability of the Ex. and Judiciary 
functionaries of the U. S. to impeachment by the Representatives of the 
people of the States, in one branch of the Legislature of the U. S. and 
trial by the Representatives of the States, in the other branch; the State 
functionaries, Legislative, Executive, & judiciary, being at the same 
time in their appointment & responsibility, altogether independent of 
the agency or authority of the U. States.89 
The independence of “State functionaries” presumably would give them 
the flexibility they needed to employ the tools of resistance Madison had 
suggested in Federalist No. 46.90  And what if those tools were to prove 
insufficient?  Madison’s answer was one that Jefferson also had finally 
accepted91: the next recourse was not nullification but the state-
application-and-convention procedure: 
Should the provisions of the Constitution as here reviewed be found 
not to secure the Govt. & rights of the States agst. usurpations & 
abuses on the part of the U. S. the final resort within the purview of the 
Constn. lies in an amendment of the Constn. according to a process 
applicable by the States.92 
That, however, was the final constitutional route to resolution.  Beyond 
the Article V convention, Madison wrote, remained only the “ultima 
ratio”: resort to arms.93 
 
 89. Id. at 395-96. 
 90. Supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 91. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (June 27, 1821), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 190 (Paul Leister Ford ed., 1904-05); see also 12 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 314 (Paul Leister Ford ed., 1905) (“Federal Edition”) (“But, finally, the peculiar 
happiness of our blessed system is, that in differences of opinion between these different [state and 
federal] sets of servants, the appeal is to neither, but to their employers peaceably assembled by 
their representatives in Convention”). 
 92. 9 MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 398. 
 93. Id.: 
And in the event of a failure of every constitutional resort, and an accumulation of 
usurpations & abuses, rendering passive obedience & non-resistence a greater evil, than 
resistence & revolution, there can remain but one resort, the last of all, an appeal from 
the cancelled obligations of the constitutional compact, to original rights & the law of 
self-preservation. This is the ultima ratio under all Govt. whether consolidated, 
confederated, or a compound of both. . . .  
Cf. James Madison, Notes on Nullification, in 9 MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 597 (1835): 
The plain answer is that the remedy is the same under the government of the United 
States as under all other Govts. established & organized on free principles. The first 
remedy is in the checks provided among the constituted authorities; that failing the next 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was far from the only 
meeting of its kind.  During the Founding Era, the interstate, or federal, 
convention was a common problem-solving device, employed by the 
states at least a dozen times from 1774 to 1787.  The interstate 
convention process was governed by well-recognized rules and 
protocols.  The frequency and familiarity of the device explain why the 
delegates drafting the Constitution resorted to it as a method of 
permitting the states to amend the document without the substantive 
participation of Congress. 
During the drafting process, Madison raised some questions about 
using the interstate convention for amendment purposes.  Those 
questions apparently were answered to his satisfaction, for he not only 
dropped his objections but offered what became the penultimate 
language of Article V.  The best way to explain his acquiescence was the 
familiarity of interstate conventions and of the rules and customs 
governing them. 
During the ratification process, Madison suggested several tools the 
states could employ in the event the federal government exceeded or 
abused its power.  Except perhaps indirectly, Madison did not mention 
the state-application-and-convention process.  Indeed, at that point 
Madison feared another interstate convention, because those promoting 
one planned to use it to substantially re-write the Constitution.  
However, Madison never opposed the state-application-and-convention 
process in general. 
After most of the other states rejected his 1798 Virginia Resolution, 
Madison came to view the Article V convention as a way to guard 
against federal governmental excesses.  By 1830, he was strongly 
promoting state-application-and-convention process as an alternative to 
nullification, and—in the event of otherwise incorrigible federal abuse—
as the last constitutional step states should pursue prior to revolution. 
 
is in the influence of the Ballot-boxes & Hustings; that again failing, the appeal lies to 
the power that made the Constitution, and can explain, amend, or remake it. Should this 
resort also fail, and the power usurped be sustained in its oppressive exercise on a 
minority by a majority, the final course to be pursued by the minority, must be a subject 
of calculation, in which the degree of oppression, the means of resistance, the 
consequences of its failure, and consequences of its success must be the elements. 
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